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PARTIES 
The parties to this litigation are: 
Appellant: U.S. Capital Corporation (hereafter "U.S. 
Capital") . 
Appellees: Warner Imports, Inc., dba Rick Warner Nissan 
(hereafter "Warner Nissan"). 
Defendant: In the original action, a default judgment was 
taken against co-defendant Eagle Auto Leasing by order of the Trial 
Court. Eagle Auto Leasing is not a party to this appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Supreme Court under Article 
VIII/ Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 58A of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the lower court err in finding that U.S. Capital's 
August 22, 1989 check was given to Warner Nissan to "cover the cost 
of the vehicle." (R. at 140). 
2. Did the lower court err in finding that "U.S. Capital 
paid for the cost of [sic] 1989 Nissan Sentra with its check." (R. 
at 140). 
3. Did the lower court err in finding that "U.S. Capital 
Corp. was negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto Leasing or one of its 
affiliates and U.S. Capital Corp.'s interest in Eagle Auto Leasing 
was further consideration for the issuance of the check to 
plaintiff by U.S. Capital." (R. at 140). 
4. Did the lower court err in finding that "plaintiff has 
been damaged by U.S. Capital's issuance of its bad check." (R. at 
141) . 
5. Did the lower court err in holding that §7-15-1 of the 
Utah Code Annotated applies in this case. (R. at 142). 
6. Did the lower court err in finding and holding that 
adequate consideration was given by plaintiff to U.S. Capital for 
its check. (R. at 142). 
7. Did the lower court err in holding that U.S. Capital was 
liable to Warner Nissan in the amount of the dishonored check. (R. 
at 142). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statute is §7-15-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE: 
Plaintiff in the lower Court brought an action to collect a 
dishonored check given to it by U.S. Capital as a favor to a third 
party, Eagle Auto Leasing. Claims were asserted based on the 
Dishonored Instrument statute and as principles of contract law to 
recover the full amount of the check. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
This matter was tried to the Court on July 11, 1990. The 
Court entered its Bench Ruling upon completion of the trial, and 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on 
September 5, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed October 4, 1990. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL: 
At the July 16, 1990 trial, the Court found in favor of the 
plaintiff under both the Dishonored Instrument statute and 
principles of contract law for the full amount of the face of the 
check and for costs and attorneys fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a civil action brought by Warner Nissan for the 
purpose of collecting on a check which was given to it as a favor 
by U.S. Capital for Eagle Auto Leasing to cover an existing debt 
created by the sale of a car by Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto 
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Leasing. Critical to understanding the facts of this case is to 
understand that it is comprised of two distinct transactions. 
A. FIRST TRANSACTION: THE SALE OF THE CAR TO EAGLE AUTO LEASING. 
Eagle Auto Leasing, is a Utah corporation which in July of 
1989 was involved in the retail sale and leasing of automobiles. 
(R. 159, at pp. 69, 81). On or about July 3, 1989, Warner Nissan 
sold a 1989 Nissan Sentra to Eagle Auto Leasing. (R. 159, at pp. 
8, 9, 46, 55). The Vehicle Buyer's Order & Purchase Agreement was 
signed by Eagle Auto Leasing. (R. 159, at p. 20, see also Exhibit 
4). It was understood that the sale of the 1989 Nissan Sentra to 
Eagle Auto Leasing was for the purpose of immediate resale to Karen 
Stoker, the retail consumer of the automobile. Eagle Auto Leasing 
did not have any special business relationship with Warner Nissan, 
and purchased automobiles at the same price as any other retail 
purchaser (R. 159 at p. 45-6). (R. 159, at p. 9). For the 
purposes of the sale, however, the transfer of the automobile was 
from Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing, no other individuals or 
entities were involved in that transaction. (R. 159, at p. 36, 
55). 
The transaction between Warner Nissan and Eagle Auto Leasing 
involved the delivery of the automobile (R. 159, at pp. 21, 35, 47) 
and the working out of arrangements for payment of the agreed upon 
price. (R. 159, at p. 22). The automobile was delivered on July 
3, 1989, and a check in the agreed upon price of $10,043.50, dated 
July 3, 1989, was given to Warner Nissan. Eagle Auto Leasing 
requested as part of the terms of the sale that the check be held 
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for seven to ten days so funds could be made available to pay the 
check. (R. 159, at pp. 22, 42, 48). In a separate transaction, the 
automobile was sold by Eagle Auto Leasing to Karen Stoker. The 
sale of the automobile by Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing was 
completed with the delivery of the vehicle and the creation of the 
debt obligation to be paid in the future. (R. 159, at pp. 36-7). 
When the debt created proved difficult to collect, Warner 
Nissan never threatened to repossess the car, something they 
acknowledged they could not do, (R. 159, at p. 34-40) nor did it 
pursue any other form of collection other than requesting payment 
from Eagle Auto Leasing. (R. 159, at pp. 38-40, 73-5, 86). 
B. SECOND TRANSACTION: DISCHARGE OF DEBT CREATED BY THE FIRST 
TRANSACTION. 
The check dated July 3, 1989 was held as agreed and was 
finally deposited for payment on July 18, 1989. (R. 157, at p. 
48). That check was subsequently returned to Warner Nissan stamped 
"RTM" "refer to maker". (R. 159, at p. 10-11). Thereafter, a 
replacement check was issued by Eagle Auto Leasing on the 27th day 
of July, 1989, which was given to Warner Nissan. (R. 159, at p. 
49). That check was returned marked "Account Closed." (R. 159, 
Exhibit 2). 
On or about August 22, 1989, Eagle Auto Leasing approached 
U.S. Capital asking as a favor for U.S. Capital to tender a check 
to Warner Nissan in the amount of $10,143.50 to cover a debt 
created by the sale of the car from Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto 
Leasing. (R. 159, at pp. 58, 80). The president of Eagle Auto 
Leasing, Pat Brody, told Ron Hansen, an officer of U.S. Capital, 
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that Warner Nissan would not accept any more checks from Eagle Auto 
Leasing so he needed as a favor to have U.S. Capital provide a 
check drawn on U.S. Capital's account to Warner Nissan. JEdL Eagle 
Auto Leasing stated that it would cover the U.S. Capital check that 
afternoon or the next day. (R. 159 at pp. 59-60). Prior to August 
22, 1989, U. S. Capital and Warner Nissan had had no prior dealings 
with each other, (R. 157, at pp. 36-37) and U. S. Capital knew 
nothing about the transaction that created the $10,043.00 debt. 
(R. 159, at p. 61). 
On or about August 22, 1989, U.S. Capital delivered a check in 
the amount of $10,143.50 to Warner Nissan to cover the debt 
obligation of Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan. (R. at 159, at 
pp. 19, 40, 79). With the delivery of the check, U.S. Capital 
received nothing from Warner Nissan, or any other party, for the 
delivery of the check. (R. 159, at pp. 41, 71, 76, 86). U.S. 
Capital never took possession of or acquired any interest in the 
car, never used the car and in fact never saw the car. (R. 159, at 
p. 85-6). 
When Eagle Auto Leasing failed to provide funds to cover U.S. 
Capital's check, U.S. Capital issued a stop order against the check 
paid to Warner Nissan. (R. 159, at pp. 76-77). 
C. RELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIOUS ENTITIES TO THE TRANSACTIONS. 
Warner Nissan was the seller of the 1989 Nissan Sentra 
automobile (R. 159, at p. 8-9). 
Eagle Auto Leasing, a Utah corporation, was the purchaser of 
the 1989 Nissan Sentra (R. 159, at p. 20). 
5 
Eagle In-House Services, is a corporation separate and 
distinct from Eagle Auto Leasing. (R. 159, at p. 57). Eagle In-
House Services was not a party to any transaction in this case. 
(R. 159, at p. 36, 55). 
U.S. Capital, a closely held corporation, as a favor to Eagle 
Auto Leasing, provided a check to Warner Nissan. (R. 159, at p. 
80). U.S. Capital never purchased any vehicle from Warner Nissan. 
(R. 159, at p. 58). U.S. Capital had no relationship, contractual 
or otherwise, with Eagle Auto Leasing (R. 159, at p. 79, 83), and 
was not involved in negotiations to acquire Eagle Auto Leasing. 
(R. 159, at p. 83-4). 
VIP Leasing has been mentioned in this case, but it is a mis-
identification of VIP*Comlink. (R. 159, at p. 57). 
Karen Stoker purchased the 1989 Nissan Sentra from Eagle Auto 
Leasing a took possession of the vehicle. (R. 159, at p. 9). 
Karen Stoker had no contact or affiliation with U.S. Capital or 
VIP*Comlink. (R. 159, at p. 28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal raises issues concerning the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting certain Findings of Fact made by the Trial 
Court, and also raises substantial questions concerning the 
application of §7-15-1 (the Dishonored Instruments statute) of the 
Utah Code Annotated, the adequacy of consideration given for U.S. 
Capital's check. 
6 
A. THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN MAKING CERTAIN CRITICAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
There is insufficient evidence to support the following 
Findings of Fact made by the Trial Court: 
(1) The August 22, 1989 check of U.S. Capital was given to 
"cover the cost of the vehicle"; 
(2) U.S. Capital "paid for the cost of [sic] 1989 Nissan 
Sentra with its check"; 
(3) "U.S. Capital Corp. was negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto 
Leasing or one of its affiliates and U.S. Capital's interest in 
Eagle Auto Leasing was further consideration for the issuance of 
the check to plaintiff by U.S. Capital"; 
(4) Plaintiff has been "damaged by U.S. Capital's issuance of 
its bad check". 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF LAW. 
The lower Court erred in its application of law by applying 
§7-15-1 of the Utah Code Annotated to this case, and under 
generally accepted principles of contract law, there was no 
consideration for the check that was given by U.S. Capital to 
Warner Nissan to support a claim for damages. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The issues addressed in this appeal relate to the sufficiency 
of evidence to support the court's Findings of Fact, and relate to 
questions of the Court's application of the Dishonored Instrument 
statute to this case and holding that sufficient consideration was 
given to support a claim against U.S. Capital. 
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A. THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN MAKING CERTAIN FINDINGS OF 
FACT SINCE THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The applicable standard for reviewing the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact is that if the Trial Court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be "against a clear weight of evidence", 
or "clearly erroneous" those findings will be rejected. In re: 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), see also Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). In this instance, 
the Trial Court made certain Findings of Fact that are not 
supported by the clear weight of evidence, and should be reversed. 
(1) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AUGUST 22, 1989 
CHECK WAS GIVEN TO "COVER THE COST OF THE VEHICLE". 
Factually, it is essential to recognize that there were two 
separate transactions involved in this case. That factual 
distinction is essential to understanding the actions of the 
parties and one which the Trial Court failed to perceive. Because 
the Trial Court failed to understand that distinction, the Trial 
Court erroneously made the Finding of Fact that the August 22, 1989 
check was given to "cover the cost" of the vehicle purchased by 
Eagle Auto Leasing and later sold to Karen Stoker. 
The record before the Trial Court reflects the following 
undisputed set of facts: A 1989 red Nissan Sentra was sold by 
Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing for ultimate sale to Karen 
Stoker. The initial sale was accomplished on July 3, 1989 with the 
delivery of the automobile and arrangements by contract for payment 
to be made available later to cover the check delivered July 3, 
1989 • The only parties to that transaction were Eagle Auto Leasing 
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and Warner Nissan. The check was held to permit funds to be made 
available to pay the check. It is undisputed that the sale of the 
Nissan Sentra was completed on July 3, 1989. U.S. Capital was not 
involved with that transaction. All that remained of the 
transaction after July 3, 1989 was a debt obligation owed by Eagle 
Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan and to be collected from the July 3f 
1989 check. 
When the car was delivered for the agreed price a debt 
obligation was created from Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan, 
which Warner Nissan thereafter tried to collect. After the July 3, 
1989 check from Eagle Auto Leasing did not clear the bank, a second 
check was given to Warner Nissan by Eagle Auto Leasing on July 27, 
1989. It also was returned uncollected. 
Warner Nissan was aware that the car was to be resold to Karen 
Stoker, and it also knew that it could not rescind the sale of the 
vehicle or pursue repossession because the car was no longer in the 
hands of Eagle Auto Leasing. Its only recourse was to pursue 
collection of the debt obligation from Eagle Auto Leasing. 
By August 22, 1989, when U.S. Capital provided its check to 
Warner Nissan as a favor to Eagle Auto Leasing, U.S. Capital and 
Warner Nissan understood that the check was being provided to clear 
up problems created by the dishonored instruments, and that U.S. 
Capital would not receive the automobile or any interest in it. 
The check delivered to Warner Nissan by U.S. Capital contained, at 
Eagle Auto Leasing's direction, an extra $100.00 which was 
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understood to be a bonus for inconvenience created by the dishonor 
of the prior two checks tendered by Eagle Auto Leasing. 
From the record, there is nothing to indicate or support a 
finding that the August 22, 1989 check was given to "cover the cost 
of the vehicle". The transaction involving the vehicle was 
completed upon its delivery on July 3, 1989, and the agreement to 
receive payment in the future. The evidence clearly establishes, 
that the August 22, 1989 check was intended to cover only the debt 
obligation of Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan which had not 
previously been satisfied because Eagle Auto Leasing7s checks were 
dishonored. In fact, plaintiff's two witnesses' testimony confirms 
and supports that fact. There is absolutely no evidence before the 
Trial Court to support a finding that the check "covered the cost 
of the vehicle". That finding should be rejected, and the Court 
should find, in accordance with the evidence, that the check was 
given to cover the debt of Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan and 
not for the purchase of the car, or as the Trial Court stated "to 
cover the cost of the vehicle." 
(2) THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT U.S. CAPITAL PAID FOR THE 
COST OF THE 1989 NISSAN SENTRA WITH ITS AUGUST 22, 1989 
CHECK. 
For the reasons stated above in (1), the August 22, 1989 check 
did not relate to the actual purchase of the 1989 Nissan Sentra, 
and those funds were not used in the closing of that transaction. 
The check provided by U.S. Capital was part of a separate 
transaction related to the retirement of the unpaid debt owed to 
Warner Nissan. The conveyance of the 1989 Nissan Sentra to Eagle 
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Auto Leasing, and its subsequent conveyance to Karen Stoker were 
completed more than a month and a half before U.S. Capital became 
involved. U.S. Capital's check did not relate to the securing of 
the conveyance of the Nissan Sentra. U.S. Capital's involvement 
related only to resolving the debt obligation created by the 
earlier sale of the car by Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing. 
Nothing from the testimony of any party gives any credence to 
the finding that "U.S. Capital paid for the cost of the Nissan 
Sentra with its check". The evidence before the Trial Court is 
insufficient to support its finding and should . therefore be 
rejected. 
(3) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT HU.S. CAPITAL WAS 
NEGOTIATING TO ACQUIRE EAGLE AUTO LEASING OR ONE OF ITS 
AFFILIATES AND U.S. CAPITAL'S INTEREST IN EAGLE AUTO 
LEASING WAS FURTHER CONSIDERATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
CHECK B5T U.S. CAPITAL". 
The Trial Court found that U.S. Capital was negotiating to 
acquire Eagle Auto Leasing and the interest U.S. Capital had in 
Eagle Auto Leasing was sufficient consideration for the issuance of 
the check to Warner Nissan. The evidence on the record is not 
sufficient to support such a finding and thus, it should be 
rejected. 
Testimony from Warner Nissan's witnesses is equivocal on the 
question of the relationship between U.S. Capital and Eagle Auto 
Leasing. That testimony is essentially based on unclear 
recollection of conversations with officers of U.S. Capital. 
Testimony of U.S. Capital's witnesses, however, is unequivocal and 
clear that U.S. Capital was not negotiating to acquire an interest 
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in Eagle Auto Leasing. Confusion with regard to this point appears 
to arise out of plaintiff's failure to recognize that another 
unrelated entity, VIP*Comlink, was identified as considering the 
acquisition of Eagle In-House Services, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
Eagle In-House Services, Inc. had a business relationship with 
Eagle Auto Leasing but was separate and distinct from Eagle Auto 
Leasing. VIP*Comlink is a Utah corporation, separate and distinct 
from U.S. Capital, and has never been a party to any of the 
transactions in this suit. 
For example, in the examination of Douglas R. Johnson, general 
manager for Rick Warner Nissan, when asked by plaintiff's counsel 
"Did you understand that U.S. Capital would be taking over and 
acquiring Eagle Auto Leasing?" his answer was "I wasn't exactly 
sure that there was anything that was going to happen there. I 
know that I tried to reach Pat Brody a number of times and he was 
over at Mr. Hansen's office before this time so I'm not sure." (R. 
159, at p. 15). In fact, Mr. Johnson candidly admits that with 
regard to U.S. Capital's connection with Eagle Auto Leasing that he 
"didn't quite catch all at that time. I was more interested in 
collecting our funds". (R. 159, at p. 13). 
Patrick Terrill, assistant sales manager for Warner Nissan, 
testified that on or about August 22, he and Mr. Johnson had talked 
with Mr. Hansen. Mr. Terrill stated that "Approximately 8-22 Doug 
told me in the morning that he had talked to the Capital Financial 
people. I don't know the name." (R. 159, at p. 50) (emphasis 
added). Mr. Terrill went on to describe the meeting. "Mr. Hansen 
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did most of the talking, saying that they had acquired Eagle Auto 
Leasing and they wanted to continue to do business with us. He 
gave us a check saying — here is the check for the car to pay for 
it." Id. When asked specifically about U.S. Capital's 
relationship to Eagle Auto Leasing, Mr. Terrill stated that "they 
talked about this VIP leasing program that they had going. I don't 
know anything about it and I said well we'll continue to do 
business with you and show them good faith to that point." (R. 
159, at p. 59). On cross-examination, Mr. Terrill stated that 
"U.S. Capital had acquired Eagle Auto Leasing," (R. 159, at p. 53), 
but could not identify the entity acquiring Eagle Auto Leasing as 
anyone other than the person he talked with, Ron Hansen. (R. 159, 
at p. 53). 
On plaintiff's direct examination of Ron Hansen, an officer of 
U.S. Capital, the relationship between U.S. Capital and Eagle Auto 
Leasing was fully explained. Mr. Hansen explained that VIP*Comlink 
had at one time looked into acquiring Eagle In-House Services, 
Inc., a different corporation than Eagle Auto Leasing. U.S. 
Capital is separate and distinct from VIP*Comlink or any of its 
subsidiaries. VTP*Comlink, was not involved in this transaction, 
and it was VTP*Comlink that at some earlier date had been 
interested in acquiring Eagle In-House Services, Inc. At no time 
did VIP*Comlink or U.S. Capital discuss, negotiate or agree to 
acquire Eagle Auto Leasing. 
The plaintiff's witnesses concede that they were never sure of 
the relationship between U.S. Capital and Eagle Auto Leasing. At 
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best, they claim they heard there was a relationship, but they 
admit that they were only concerned with collecting the money due 
from Eagle Auto Leasing regardless of the source. 
In short, the record before the Trial Court is devoid of any 
clear evidence that U.S. Capital was negotiating to acquire Eagle 
Auto Leasing. The finding by the court that U.S. Capital was 
negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto Leasing or one of its affiliates 
and U.S. Capital's interest in Eagle Auto Leasing was further 
consideration for the issuance of the check to plaintiff by U.S. 
Capital is not supported by substantive evidence and should be 
rejected. 
(4) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT -PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN 
DAMAGED BY U.S. CAPITAL CORPORATION'S ISSUANCE OF ITS BAD 
CHECK." 
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that Warner 
Nissan was damaged by U.S. Capital's tender of its check which it 
stopped payment on. The history of the case is clear. Warner 
Nissan delivered the car to Eagle Auto Leasing and accepted two 
checks from Eagle Auto Leasing that were later dishonored before 
U.S. Capital tendered its check to Warner Nissan at the request of 
and as a favor to Eagle Auto Leasing. Warner Nissan had never 
threatened suit, and had not attempted to repossess the automobile, 
an action which Warner Nissan concedes it had no right to do 
because the car was almost immediately transferred to Karen Stoker. 
Warner Nissan did not refrain or forebear from taking any action 
because of U.S. Capital's tender of its check, and no new injury 
resulted from the stop order. 
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In short, the tender of the check by U.S. Capital did not 
create any new damage, new loss or any damage or loss at all to 
Warner Nissan. The record is replete with confirmation from Warner 
Nissan that they parted with nothing at the time the check was 
tendered by U.S. Capital. Where the record is so complete in its 
demonstration that no damage was done to Warner Nissan, the court's 
finding that plaintiff has been damaged is without substantive 
evidence, and clearly erroneous. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW. 
The standard of review for conclusions of law entered by the 
Trial Court is that the court will accord conclusions of law no 
particular deference but review them for correctness. Scharf v. 
BMG Corporation, 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 1985). In this instance, the 
Trial Court erred in holding that U.S. Capital is liable to Warner 
Nissan under the Dishonored Instruments Statute, U.C.A. §7-15-1, 
and that adequate consideration existed for Warner Nissan's 
collection of the U.S. Capital check. 
(1) U.S. CAPITAL DOES NOT HAVE LIABILITY UNDER THE DISHONORED 
INSTRUMENTS STATUTE. 
The Dishonored Instruments Statute, §7-15-1, U.C.A. provides 
in pertinent part that 
Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues any check, 
draft, order or other instrument upon any depository . . 
. for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm , 
partnership, or corporation any money, merchandise, 
property, or other thing of value or paving for services, 
wages, salary, or rent is liable to the holder of the 
check if the check . . . is not honored upon presentment 
and is marked "refer to maker" . . ., or the account upon 
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which the check . . . has been drawn does not exist , has 
been closed, or does not have sufficient funds or 
sufficient credit for payment in full of the check . . . 
. (emphasis added) 
In this case, critical to the application of this statute against 
U.S. Capital is the check being sued on must be given for one of 
the purposes established in the statute. Section 7-15-1 applies 
only where the check is given "for the purpose of obtaining" 
"money, merchandise, property, or other like things of value, or 
paying for services, wages, salary or rent". In this case there is 
no allegation that the August 22, 1989, check was given for any of 
those specified purposes. In fact it is undisputed that U.S. 
Capital did not receive anything of value from Warner Nissan in 
exchange for the August 22, 1989 check. Thus, where the plaintiff 
did not part with anything of value in taking the August 22, 1989, 
check from the defendant there is no cause of action against the 
defendant under §7-15-1, U.C.A. Because the lower Court improperly 
applied the Dishonored Instruments statute to this case that 
determination should be reversed. 
(2) WARNER NISSAN CANNOT COLLECT ON THE AUGUST 22, 1989, 
CHECK FROM U.S. CAPITAL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
CONSIDERATION GIVEN. 
The lower Court erroneously held that sufficient consideration 
was given for U.S. Capital's August 22, 1989, check to permit 
Warner Nissan to enforce its collection. The record is clear, 
however, that no consideration was ever given by Warner Nissan or 
any other party to U.S. Capital for the benefit given. Corbin on 
Contracts states that "[t]he promise of one person to pay a pre-
existing debt owed to the promisee by a third person is not 
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enforceable in the absence of a consideration . . . The third 
person's pre-existing debt is not a sufficient 'past consideration' 
to support the defendants promise to pay it." Id., at 306 (4th 
edition)(emphasis added). Corbin goes on to explain 
it is beyond question that the debt or obligation of the 
principal obligor is not a sufficient basis for the 
enforcement of the promise of the surety-or guarantor. 
If the promise of the principal and the surety are made 
simultaneously, they may be supported by a single 
consideration; the loan of money by the creditor to the 
principal is a sufficient consideration for the promise 
of both principal and surety. But for the promise of any 
surety that is made subsequently to the advance of money 
to the principal, there must be new consideration. The 
fact that the loan has been made and the principal is 
indebted is not a sufficient reason for enforcement of 
the surety's subsequent promise. 
Id. (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added) 
In this case, it is undisputed that the debt which arose 
between Eagle Auto Leasing and Warner Nissan was supported by 
consideration given by Warner Nissan in the form of the car 
conveyed. U.S. Capital, however, was not a party to that 
transaction. Two months later when U.S. Capital .presented its 
check to Warner Nissan, no new consideration was given for its 
involvement. The pre-existing obligation between Warner Nissan and 
Eagle Auto Leasing, which included the conveyance of the car, is 
insufficient as a matter of law to serve as consideration for U.S. 
Capital's tender of its check. 
The record is devoid of any evidence that consideration was 
given for U.S. Capital's check. The lower Court erroneously found 
that consideration for the check existed because U.S. Capital was 
acquiring Eagle Auto Leasing. Whether that is sufficient 
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consideration, is both unclear and irrelevant because U.S. Capital 
was not acquiring Eagle Auto Leasing and had never considered it. 
No other real or imagined benefit, by way of money, property or 
even forbearance to purse legal remedies, was given for U.S. 
Capital's check to Warner Nissan. 
If the debt created by the sale of the vehicle to Eagle Auto 
Leasing is viewed as consideration to support Warner Nissan's claim 
on U.S. Capital's check, it would mean that U.S. Capital's issuance 
of its check resulted in its assumption of the Eagle Auto Leasing 
debt. As assumption of the debt of another, to be enforceable, 
must meet the Utah Statute of Frauds, §25-5-1 et seq. or it is 
void. Section 25-5-4(2)provides that "every promise to answer for 
the debt . . . of another" is void "unless the agreement or some 
note or memorandum of the agreement is in writing signed by the 
party to be charged with the agreement." Furthermore, Utah law 
requires that any note or memorandum relied upon to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds must contain all the essential terms and 
provisions of the assumption agreement. Birdzell v. Utah Oil Ref., 
Co., 242 P.2d 578 (1952). No evidence of any memorandum was ever 
presented by Warner Nissan, and the evidence is clear that U.S. 
Capital never intended to assume or become responsible for Eagle 
Auto Leasing's debt. 
Finally, the lower Court held that Warner Nissan was holder in 
due course of the U.S. Capital check. That holding has no bearing 
on this case and does not preclude any of U.S. Capital's defenses 
to collection of the check. Section 70A-3-305(2), states that "a 
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holder in due course takes the instrument free from . . . all 
defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has 
not dealt . . ."(emphasis added). In a suit against a party with 
whom the holder in due course has dealt, the defendant can plead 
all defenses to the collection of the check including lack of 
consideration. Hankland, Uniform Commercial Code, §§3-302:04, 3-
305:03. Therefore, regardless of Warner Nissan's status as a 
holder in due course, there is no bar to U.S. Capital's defenses 
including the defense of lack or want of consideration. 
The lower Court's ruling that there is adequate consideration 
for the enforcement of a claim for $10,043.00 against U.S. Capital 
is without basis and should be reversed. The record fails to 
demonstrate any consideration flowing to any party because of the 
tender of the August 22, 1989 check by U.S. Capital. In addition, 
the record is clear that Warner Nissan suffered no detriment, gave 
nothing of value, and did not forebear or relinquish any right by 
the acceptance of the check. Where it is so abundantly clear that 
no consideration existed for the tender of the check, Warner Nissan 
has no claim to enforce the collection of the check against U.S. 
Capital. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower Court clearly erred in making Findings of Fact that 
the August 22, 1989 check of U.S. Capital was given to "cover the 
cost of the vehicle," and that U.S. Capital "paid for the cost of 
the 1989 Nissan Sentra with its check." There is no evidence to 
support those findings If anything, those findings arose out of 
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the lower Court's failure to understand that the sale of the 
vehicle which had been completed nearly two months earlier, was not 
contingent upon or related to the delivery of the August 22, 1989 
check. 
In addition, the lower Court clearly erred in finding that 
consideration existed for the tender of the U.S. Capital check. 
Nothing of value passed from Warner Nissan or any other party to 
U.S. Capital in consideration for the check. Finally, the lower 
Court erred in finding that Warner Nissan had been damaged by U.S. 
Capital's issuance of its bad check. There is no evidence to 
support this finding, and in fact, the clear weight of the evidence 
establishes that Warner Nissan parted with nothing in accepting 
U.S. Capital's check, including any right to pursue any claim 
against Eagle Auto Leasing. Because there is insufficient evidence 
to support the Court's Findings of Fact, those Findings of Fact 
should be rejected, and this case should be remanded to the lower 
Court with directions that Findings of Facts be entered which are 
consistent with the clear weight of the evidence. 
The lower Court erred in its application of law by applying 
§7-15-1 of the U.C.A., and in holding that sufficient consideration 
existed for the enforcement of collection of a $10,043.00 debt from 
U.S. Capital. Specifically, §7-15-1 applies only when an 
instrument is given for the purpose of obtaining money, 
merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for 
services, wages, salary or rent. The check given in this instance 
was given for none of those purposes, and nothing of value was 
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received in exchange for that check that meets the requirements of 
§7-15-1. Where the requirements of §7-15-1 have clearly not been 
met, the lower Court erred in applying that statute to this case. 
Similarly, the record before the Court is clear that no 
consideration was given for the issuance of U.S. Capital's check. 
Where there is a lack of consideration for an obligation, that 
obligation cannot be enforced. 
Because the Court has erred in its application of both the 
Dishonored Instruments Statute, and in holding that consideration 
existed for the issuance of U.S. Capital's check, those 
determinations should be reversed, and the matter should be 
remanded to the lower Court with direction that judgment be entered 
in favor of U.S. Capital. 
DATED this /<£ftf day of April, 1991. 
STOKER & THOMAS 
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IN THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARNER IMPORTS, INC., 
dba RICK WARNER NISSAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
U.S. CAPITAL CORPORATION, 
a dissolved corporation, 
and EAGLE AUTO LEASING, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 890906750CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
This case having come on for trial before the above-entitled 
Court on the 16th day of July 1990 upon the plaintiff's Complaint, 
the Answer of defendant, U.S. Capital Corp., and the other 
pleadings and documents on file, the plaintiff being represented 
by J. Angus Edwards of Purser, Okazaki & Berrett, defendant, 
U.S. Capital, being represented by Stephen G. Stoker of Stoker & 
Thomas and defendant, Eagle Auto Leasing Corp., not appearing in 
person or by counsel. The Court having heard and considered the 
evidence adduced at trial, the documents in the file and the 
arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes the following findings 
of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place 
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. U.S. Capital Corp. is a dissolved Utah corporation. 
3. The matter in controversy exceeds the sura of $10,000. 
4. Plaintiff is a full service Nissan automobile dealership. 
5. Plaintiff sold a 1989 Nissan Sentra to defendant, Eagle 
Auto Leasing, for the use and benefit of Karen Stoker. 
6. Defendant, Eagle Auto Leasing, issued a check dated July 
3, 1989 in the sum of $10,043.50 and a check dated July 27, 1989 
in the amount of $10,143.50 payable to plaintiff for the purchase 
of the 1989 Nissan Sentra on behalf of plaintiff, but both checks 
were dishonored for insufficient funds. 
7. Defendant, U.S. Capital Corp., signed and issued a 
check made payable to plaintiff dated August 22, 1989 in 
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the sum of $10,143,50 to cover the cost of the vehicle, service 
charges and the problems with the prior bad checks. 
8. Plaintiff received two checks from Eagle and Auto Leasing 
and a third check from U.S. Capital and delivered them to its bank 
for payment. 
9. Consideration for issuance of the check by defendant, U.S. 
Capital Corp., included the giving of the third check for the two 
prior bad checks. 
10. Eagle Auto Leasing, promised to pay or reimburse U.S. 
Capital for the $10,143.50 payment by check from U.S. Capital to 
plaintiff. 
11. Plaintiff refused to accept any additional checks from 
Eagle Auto Leasing and, therefore, U.S. Capital paid for the cost 
of 1989 Nissan Sentra with its check as a direct result of 
plaintiff's refusal to receive further checks from Eagle Auto 
Leasing. 
12. U.S. Capital Corp. was negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto 
Leasing or one of its affiliates and U.S. Capital Corp.'s interest 
in Eagle Auto Leasing was further consideration for the issuance 
of the check to plaintiff by U.S. Capital. 
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13. U.S. Capital issued a stop payment order only after Eagle 
Auto Leasing failed to deliver its reimbursement check to U.S. 
Capital. 
14. The testimony by defendant was that the check from U.S. 
Capital Corp. was issued as a favor or gift to Pat Brody. 
15. Defendant received timely and effective notice from 
plaintiff that defendant's check had been dishonored by certified 
letter dated October 17, 1989. 
16. Plaintiff has been damaged by U.S. Capital Corp.'s 
issuance of its bad check in the amount of the check of $10,143.50, 
including service charges of $30.00, and a service charge on the 
check from U.S. Capital in the sum of $15.00 for a total principal 
amount of $10,158.50, plus pre-judgment interest at the lawful 
rate. 
17. Plaintiff is entitled to all costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees pursuant to § 7-15-1, but determination 
of the amount of fees and costs ±s expressly reserved until 
the matter is scheduled and heard before the above-entitled 
Court. 
18. Plaintiff was an innocent party and had no knowledge or 
warning that the check from U.S. Capital might be dishonored or was 
contingent on payment from Eagle Auto Leasing. 
A03385.jae 
89-090.6 
4 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The jurisdiction and venue of this Court is proper, 
2. Default Judgment shall be entered only against defendant, 
Eagle Auto Leasing, for its failure to answer or otherwise appear. 
3. Adequate consideration was given by plaintiff in exchange 
for the check from defendant, U.S. Capital Corp. 
4. U.S. Capital Corp.'s check was dishonored within the 
meaning of § 7-15-1. 
5. Alternatively, plaintiff is deemed to be a holder in due 
course. 
6. Defendant received timely and effective notice from 
plaintiff that its check had been dishonored by certified mail 
dated October 17, 1989. 
7. Defendant is liable for the amount of its dishonored 
check in the sum of $10,143.50, a service charge of $15.00, 
pre-judgment interest at the lawful rate, all plaintiff's costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees to be determined at a subsequent 
hearing• 
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LET JUDGMENT 3E ENTERED ACCORDINGLY 
DATED this JT day of , 1990 
BY THE COURT: 
onorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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